5
bystander is more clearly impermissible. On Jeff's amendment, your killing of an innocent bystander is a means of triggering a bomb to go off that will destroy the trolley that is threatening you.
A problem with Jeff's friendly amendment is that here the innocent bystander is someone whose presence you opportunistically exploit in order to save your life, and you would not have been able to save your life if this innocent person had been absent from the scene. That feature renders this case disanalogous from the case in which you vaporize a falling nonresponsible threat since, if that person had been absent from the scene, you would have been completely safe from harm.
8 Killing someone as a means of detonating a bomb is, in Warren Quinn's helpful terminology, a case of "opportunistic agency," whereas the killing of the falling projectile is a case of "eliminative agency." Since opportunistic agency is, other things equal, more morally problematic than eliminative agency, one cannot straightforwardly appeal to the wrongness of killing an innocent bystander as a means of detonating a bomb in Jeff's revised Case I in order to establish the wrongness of killing a falling threat. So one cannot move from the impermissibility of killing in Jeff's revised Case I to the impermissibility of killing in my Case III involving the falling threat.
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Jeff's revision of my Case I therefore amounts to overkill, so to speak. If the killing of an innocent bystander in my original Case I is not sufficiently clearly morally problematic for my purposes, Jeff revises that case into a case that is, so to speak, too morally problematic for my purposes. I need to find a 'Goldilocks' case in between the two: one that contains just the right balance of moral features. By this I mean a case where killing in self-defense is intuitively impermissible by virtue of features 6 that render it analogous to the killing of a nonresponsible threat rather than by virtue of features that render it morally more problematic than the killing of such a threat.
In my search for the perfect Goldilocks case, I shall first consider a case involving an innocent obstructer that Jeff has more recently settled on, in Killing in War, in order to defend the claim that it is impermissible to kill a nonresponsible threat. Unlike a threat, an innocent obstructer poses no danger of killing you. But, like a threat, and unlike a bystander, his presence poses a problem for you: namely, this person's live body is in the way of what you need to save your life. In Jeff's case, you must cross "a high, narrow, and wobbly public bridge" in order to escape a murderer.
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Unfortunately, the only way for you to get across this bridge is to clear a path for yourself by toppling someone else off the bridge who is innocently minding his own business. Intuitively, such a killing is The problem is that the apparently morally significant distinction between killings that are causally upstream the good, and those that aren't, can be deployed in order to distinguish the killing of the innocent obstructer on the bridge from the killing of a nonresponsible threat. The killing of this obstructer is causally upstream the good of the elimination of a threat to your life. By contrast, the vaporization of a falling threat is not causally upstream the achievement of the good of the elimination of the threat to your life. Rather, it is one and the same event as this elimination. So Jeff's objection to my appeal to the driving-over case to defend the impermissibility of the hurling of a grenade in Case I turns out also to be an objection to his own appeal to the obstructer on the bridge in order to defend the impermissibility of the killing of a nonresponsible threat. The objection is that it is not clear that one is entitled to appeal to the impermissibility of an upstream killing in order to establish the impermissibility of an otherwise similar but non-upstream killing. This is because these killings differ in the apparently morally significant respect that one is upstream and the other is not.
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We need to turn to a different sort of case in order to establish the impermissibility of the killing of a nonresponsible threat. 13 We need a case of an obstructer whose elimination is not causally upstream the securing of the good of one's life. Rather, it is a case in which his elimination, or rather his displacement, is itself the securing of the good of the saving of one's own life. There is a case of Judith Thomson's that seems to fits the bill perfectly.
Perhaps it is the fabled Goldilocks case: In each case, the person's body or the physical space he occupies is useful to you. Hence, you "take advantage of, or exploit, the body or the physical space of someone else." Moreover, in each case, the person has "a rightful claim" --i.e., a "claim-right" --to this body or space. 17 When you vaporize a falling threat, by contrast, you do not take advantage of or exploit his body or his physical space, as you make use of neither.
I agree with Jon that whether the bystander or the obstructer has a rightful claim to the body or space that he possesses is relevant to the 15 Here I am asserting, rather than arguing for, such morality parity. But in "Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense," I rejected a number of arguments that could be offered on behalf of the claim that the killing of such a falling threat is morally distinguishable from the killing of the person in the alcove. 16 If one reason why it is intuitive that crushing the one in the alcove is impermissible is that this is an 'up close and personal' killing, note that people would condemn as impermissible a comparably up close and personal killing of a falling threats: e.g., you need to reach your hands up and deflect the falling threat over a cliff to prevent him from landing on your head and killing you. 17 Quong, "Killing in Self-Defense," Ethics, pp. 528-9. Quong explicitly addresses a different alcove case, also due to Thomson, in which you need to grab the person in the alcove and throw him onto the track in order to gain lifesaving access to this alcove. Insofar as my aim of demonstrating the impermissibility of killing an innocent threat is concerned this, alcove case suffers the same problem as Jeff's bridge and miner cases: the harming of the one is causally upstream the good in a manner that contrasts with the vaporization of a threat. This case is also less good for Quong's purposes for a reason which I indicate in a footnote below. party. You could, however, pull them out of the car, thereby ensuring they will die, so you can get inside to safety.
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Jon maintains that it would be permissible to pull this person from the car and occupy it yourself, on grounds that "it is, after all, your car" and not his.
He deems this permissible even if this would clearly involve a killing rather than a withdrawal of aid because "the only way to remove them from the car is to throw them out the door and off the edge of the cliff." 19 I'm not sure whether I share Jon's intuition that this is permissible. I am, however, more willing to go along with an analogous claim that it would be permissible for you to jump into the car, thereby crushing the occupant, if that were the only way for you to gain refuge from the meteor. 20 It is also worth adding that, if this were his car, rather than yours, then it would clearly be impermissible for you to take refuge in his car, either by removing him from the car or by crushing him to death.
How does this bear on Thomson's alcove case? If the alcove is his rather than yours because he rightfully owns it, then it is, by parity of reasoning, impermissible for you to take refuge there, thereby crushing him.
But what if neither you nor he has a legitimate title deed to the alcove?
What if we stipulate that the alcove is neither your nor his private property but rather is public property? We are, after all, speaking of an alcove on a metropolitan subway platform in Thomson's example. Here it would seem that the person who happens already to be in the alcove has no right over the space to ground the claim that it is impermissible for you to occupy his space, thereby crushing him to death.
Jon thinks otherwise. He maintains that the person already in the alcove has a claim-right to the space along the lines of the following individual in a public park:
Suppose Albert and Betty are in a public park, and Albert desires to get a better view of the lake but can only do so if Betty moves from her present location where she is enjoying a picnic. Albert cannot simply move Betty, even if this causes her no harm, and even if he is somehow able to do this without touching Betty (thus avoiding violating any claims she might have against nonconsensual touching).
Betty has a presumptive claim-right to her location even though it is a public park, and even though it is more or less arbitrary that Betty arrived at that particular spot first.
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Here is one problem with such an appeal to the existence of rightful claims over the world as the explanation for the impermissibility of killing in 21 P. 528.
12 the alcove case. Suppose that it is a two-year-old child rather than a full-grown adult whom you would crush if you jump into the alcove to escape the oncoming trolley. Intuitively, it is at least as clear that it is impermissible to crush such a child as it is to crush a full-grown adult. On Jon's account of permissibility, this would be by virtue of the fact that this child has acquired a rightful claim to the space she occupies. One might, however, doubt that such young children can have rightful claims to the space they occupy, especially given that Jon's rationale for the existence of such claim-rights is "grounded in a view of persons as self-directing agents." 22 But even if we restrict our attention to rational full-grown adults, Jon's account can be challenged, as I shall now show, on grounds that people in public spaces such as parks and alcoves lack the claim-right to which he appeals. The upshot of this discussion is that it is a right of self-ownership not to be imposed upon, rather than a right not to have made use of something to which one has a rightful claim --whether it be one's body or the space one occupies --which explains the impermissibility of jumping into the alcove and crushing the person who has taken refuge there. The right not to 15 be imposed upon here is a right against being the object of harmful eliminative agency. This right obtains even when the harmful eliminative agency is not causally upstream the good, insofar as the crushing of the one and the occupation of the refuge are one and the same. The morally impermissible crushing of the person in the alcove is morally on a par with the vaporization of the falling threat. Hence the latter is impermissible.
II. The case for killing a blameless but morally responsible threat
I would now like to turn to a discussion of cases in which it is permissible rather than impermissible, on the moral responsibility account, to kill another in self-defense. In particular, I would like to consider a class of cases in which it is permissible to kill somebody because she is morally responsible even though she is also blameless. Recall, for example, the case involving a foreign dignitary and a hologram, with which I opened this paper. If the dignitary shoots in self-defense, she would be doing something objectively wrong: she would be killing a nonresponsible person who is not liable to be killed, and whose killing cannot be justified on grounds apart from liability. But such a killing would be subjectively morally justifiable, since she would be acting on the justified (but false) belief that she is defending herself against an attack by a culpable assassin.
Is the dignitary liable to be defensively killed, if this is the only way to save the life of the person who has innocently reached out to shake her hand? May one kill such a morally responsible but blameless active threat in order to save the life of the innocent whom she threatens?
As far as I am aware, Kai Draper was the first person to pose such a question about morally responsible but non-culpable active threats. In an article called "Fairness and Self-Defense," which was The Cell Phone Operator: A man's cell phone has, without his knowledge, been reprogrammed so that when he next presses the "send" button, the phone will send a signal that will detonate a bomb that will then kill an innocent person.
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The cell phone operator is a responsible agent. He is, one might say, as responsible as any other normal adult human being for the choice of buttons he pushes on his phone. But Jeff plausibly maintains that the cell phone operator is not responsible for posing a threat to another by pressing "send."
He is not responsible for posing a threat because he has no way of knowing that doing so will kill someone. In Jeff's words "he is nonculpably and invincibly ignorant that he poses any kind of threat to risk of harm to anyone."
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If, moreover, we apply the option-luck/brute-luck distinction to this case, it is clearly an instance of brute luck rather than option luck, since, in pressing "send," he has not thereby accepted "an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined." Of course it is as the result of his choice to press "send," which he could have refrained from making, that he ends up killing the one. But such avoidability does not distinguish this case from Dworkin's paradigmatic meteorite example of brute luck in which we can imagine that it is as the result of a choice to sit at this table rather than the next one that I end up being hit by the meteorite.
The meteorite example also serves to answer one line of objection to the distinction that Jeff and I wish to draw between cases such as the 19 dignitary on the one hand and the cell phone operator on the other hand.
One might argue that anything we do involves a gamble, because we never know what weird and wild risks might arise from our choices. We have to be ever vigilant to the possibility that whatever we do might harm others by however improbable a causal chain. But the fact that every action is, in some sense, a gamble insofar as it exposes one to risk of some sort, including a gamble to sit at a table that ends up being crushed by a meteorite -that fact doesn't obliterate the moral significance of the distinction between a loss that is the upshot of one's gambling everything on a roulette wheel and a loss that is the upshot of one's having chosen a table in the path of a meteorite. One couldn't credibly demand compensation for one's losses at roulette on grounds that one has just as strong a claim of compensation for bad luck as the person who was hit by the meteorite.
Similarly, the fact that there's some chance that pressing "send" will kill an innocent doesn't obliterate the distinction between pressing "send" and firing a bullet at someone.
I would like to close by considering another case of Jeff's. Like his cell phone case, this one involves an unintended harm, whereas my case of the foreign dignitary involves an intention to harmfully incapacitate another. But unlike the cell phone case, in this case one is aware of the fact that one's activity poses a real danger to others:
The Conscientious Driver: A person who always keeps her car well maintained and always drives carefully and alertly decides to drive to the cinema. On the way, a freak event that she could not have anticipated occurs that causes her car to veer out of control in the direction of a pedestrian. Although she does not intend to harm anyone, she does know that her action carries a small risk of causing great though unintended harm.
Although her act is of a type that is generally objectively permissible, and although she has taken due care to avoid harming anyone, she has had bad luck: the risk she knew her act carried has now, improbably and through no fault of her own, been realized. Because she knew of the small risk to others that her driving would impose, and because she nonetheless voluntarily chose to drive when there was no moral reason for her to do so[,] … she is morally liable to defensive action to prevent her from killing an innocent bystander.
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In an article entitled "Liability to Defensive Harm," Jonathan Quong concurs with Jeff and me that the dignitary has, by taking aim at an innocent, rendered himself liable to being defensively killed. Yet he rejects the view that the conscientious driver has also rendered himself liable. He rejects our moral responsibility account of liability in favor of a different one, which tracks an interesting feature that differentiates the dignitary from the conscientious driver. In raising her pistol to shoot the person whom she believes to be threatening her life, the dignitary acts as if the people whom she confronts lacks rights that he in fact has. And Jon maintains that:
To treat others as if they lack moral rights against having harm imposed is a grave matter, and so it is plausible to suppose that when we act in this way, we must accept a certain substantive responsibility for our actions. If we treat others as if they are liable to harm, it 21 seems only fair to suppose that we may become liable to defensive harm should that judgment be mistaken.
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By contrast, the conscientious driver never acts on the assumption that anyone lacks rights that he in fact has. The justification of our traffic laws to which he conforms, which appeals to a calculation of the costs and benefits of driving, including the cost of accidental deaths, does not depend on any assumption that people lack rights not to be harmed that they in fact possess. Nor, of course, does any individual driver hurtle accidentally out of control towards a pedestrian on the assumption that this pedestrian lacks rights not to be harmed. Of such a case, Jon writes:
But when our risk-imposing actions do not treat anyone else as lacking moral rights against harm-when we have an independent moral justification for the evidence-relative permission to impose harm or risk of harm on others that does not depend on this assumption-then the moral picture seems very different. Liability to defensive harm, on this view, is grounded in a particular conception of what it means to treat others with the concern and respect they are due.
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I think this is a deep and important difference that Jon has identified between the dignitary on the one hand, and the conscientious driver on the other hand. But I don't think this distinction is sufficient, as Jon maintains, to support his view that the conscientious driver retains his non-liability to defensive harm. Rather, I think this difference simply mitigates the extent to which his dangerous activity for which he's morally responsible renders him liable to such defensive harm.
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Jon maintains that the situation between the driver and the pedestrian is completely symmetrical in the following two respects: (i) neither has rendered himself liable to defensive harms by forfeiting his rights, but (ii) each has an agent-relative permission to defend his own life, even though this would infringe the non-forfeited right not to be killed of the other.
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Such a symmetrical approach faces the following difficulty. It cannot account for the following moral phenomena. When the car veering towards the pedestrian contains just the morally responsible driver, rather than just an innocent passenger (say a young child who cannot take control of the car, whose driver has been thrown from the car), the pedestrian has more of a justification to hurl the grenade at the car in self-defense. 34 The difference can't be one of agent-relative permission: such permission ought to be just as great in either case. Rather, the difference is that the driver becomes liable by virtue of his moral responsibility for driving a foreseeably potentially lethal vehicle, whereas there is no plausible account according to which the passenger could become liable.
I think Bernard Williams's famous remarks about the agentregret of the unfortunate lorry driver are highly pertinent here:
The lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child, will feel differently from any spectator, even a spectator next to him in the cab, except perhaps to the extent that the spectator takes on the thought that he himself might have prevented it, an agent's thought. …We feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, indeed presupposes, that there is something special about his relation to this 33 Seth Lazar has extensively defended the symmetry of the driver and the pedestrian in the first of these two respects. See his 'Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defense', Ethics (2009). 34 In fact, I think the hurling of the grenade would be unjustified when just the child is in the car: such a case is essentially the same as my Case II which I discussed in Section I above, in which a trolley with an innocent bystander stuck inside is hurtling towards you.
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happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it was not his fault.
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It is, I think, telling that anything remotely approaching the same degree of agent-regret would be out of place if it were experienced by the person who has caused a bomb to go off by pressing "send" on his cell phone. The difference between the reactions of the two to the killings of which they're each a cause is, I think, to be explained by the fact that the lorry driver, though blameless for the manner in which he drove, realizes that he is nevertheless morally responsible for engaging in activity that he knows to run such risks. There is no such moral responsibility in the case of the cell phone operator -at least one who has not yet been alerted, by a reading of Jeff's work, to the potentially lethal effects of pressing "send." Williams notes that a lorry driver might appropriately "act in some way which he hopes will constitute or at least symbolise some kind of recompense or restitution, and this will be an expression of his agent-regret." 36 I would just add, that it would also be appropriate for him, and for us, to acknowledge that his having rendered himself liable to defensive killing might well be another consequence of such morally responsible, albeit nonculpable, agency. The only real difference between the two is a difference of timing:
while it is the Nonresponsible Cause's movement in the past that is the innocent cause of a present threat, the Nonresponsible Threat innocently causes a present threat by his movement or presence now.
And it is hard to see how this mere difference in timing...could by itself make a decisive moral difference, making it permissible to kill one who is the present cause of a present threat (that is, the Nonresponsible 37 See n. 13 {confirm note #} above. 38 Ethics of Killing, . This is, in fact, a refined version of a similar case that appears in 'Innocent Attacker'.
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Threat) when it is clearly impermissible to kill one who is the past cause of a present threat (that is, the Nonresponsible Cause).
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A problem with Jeff's trapped miner case is that the killing of this miner would be causally upstream the good. This is because the miner stands in the way of your securing of the lifesaving good of a supply of oxygen for yourself four to five hours hence. You need to eliminate him now in order to gain access to this oxygen later.
